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Judicial Ethics: Lessons from the Chicago Eight Trial
Laurie L. Levenson*
Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously; to answer wisely; to
consider soberly; and to decide impartially. –Socrates1
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INTRODUCTION
In September of 1969, eight defendants—known widely as the
“Chicago Eight”2—were charged with conspiracy and, in violation of the
federal Anti-Riot Act, “individually crossing state lines and making
speeches with intent to ‘incite, organize, promote and encourage’ riots.”3
* Professor of Law & David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. I am extremely grateful to my research assistant, Daniel Aronsohn, for all of his incredible
help on this Article. From researching to drafting, Daniel was very much my partner in this
endeavor, and I am extremely grateful. I am also grateful to my other research assistant, Kelly
Larocque, and the members of the SEALS discussion group on Judging: Fifty Years after the
Chicago 7 Trial for their insights on my work.
1. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 29 (1961).
2. Although Bobby Seale was eventually severed from the case, and thus tried separately from
the other defendants, this Article will address all of the defendants as the “Chicago Eight” for the
sake of consistency.
3. JOHN SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL 9 (rev. ed. 1993).
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Though the substantive charges arose from the defendants’ protests
against the Vietnam War, the trial focused on a different type of
contempt—contempt toward the court.4 The showdown between ’60s
radicals, their determined attorneys, and an authoritarian judge became a
showcase for the critical lesson judges and the country must learn—the
quality of justice depends not only on the laws themselves, but on those
responsible for implementing the laws, especially our judges.
In the Chicago Eight Trial, the defendants—David Dellinger, Abbie
Hoffman, Bobby Seale, Thomas Hayden, Jerry Rubin, Rennard Davis,
John Froines, and Lee Weiner—were considered “left-wing radicals”
who opposed America’s involvement in the Vietnam War.5 The charges
brought against them resulted from a fervent and violent protest of the
1968 Democratic National Convention.6 On the first day of trial, seven
of the eight defendants—all but Bobby Seale—immediately set the
contentious tone when they declined to stand for the judge.7 At that
moment, those defendants previewed how they would transform the
courtroom into “a circus”8 in protest of the judicial and political systems
of the United States. From bringing “a birthday cake to court on the
judge’s birthday” to displaying the Vietnamese flag,9 the defendants
would make every effort to ensure a boisterous and unforgettable trial.
On the other hand, Bobby Seale, National Chairman of the Black Panther
Party,10 quickly stood out from the rest of the group. Though all of the
defendants acted contemptuously in their own respects, Bobby Seale
served as an especially profound disturbance to the judge. After recurring
courtroom outbursts, which led to his being bound and gagged,11 Seale
was severed from the case and sentenced to four years in prison for
contempt of court.12
Presiding over the case was the controversial Judge Julius J.

4. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Lessons of the ‘60s: “We’d Do It Again,” Say the Chicago
Seven’s Lawyers, A.B.A. J., May 15, 1987, at 32, 32–35 (summarizing the defendants’ interactions
with Judge Julius Hoffman); see also Judge Julius Hoffman Dies, WASH. POST, July 2, 1983, at D6
(noting, for instance, that Judge Hoffman “cited defense attorney Kunstler 24 times” for contempt).
5. Chicago Seven Trial: 1969, in GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS 586 (Edward W. Knappman ed.,
1994).
6. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 9; see infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
7. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 37.
8. Susan Coutin, The Chicago Seven and the Sanctuary Eleven: Conspiracy and Spectacle in
U.S. Courts, 16 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 19, 22 (1993).
9. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, AMERICA ON TRIAL: INSIDE THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT
TRANSFORMED OUR NATION 391 (2004).
10. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 37.
11. Id. at 63.
12. Id. at 78.
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Hoffman.13 One commentator, who observed Judge Hoffman’s
courtroom before and during the Chicago Eight Trial, described the
Judge’s demeanor: “He was just as ready and salty of tongue and just as
domineering and just as enjoying of himself when he felt himself looking
good and winning, as he would be in the [Chicago Eight] Trial.”14 Judge
Hoffman, embraced by federal prosecutors because of his vehement
support for the United States government,15 portrayed himself as a
“keeper of the gate of culture against the counterculture.”16 Moreover,
his keen awareness of the public scrutiny of his role, both in previous
cases and in the Chicago Eight Trial,17 ensured that he would maintain
the perception of control in his courtroom. However, Judge Hoffman was
ill equipped for such a political trial,18 choosing to adhere to his own code
of authoritarianism and admonition rather than the judicially upstanding
position with which he was tasked to embody.
Ultimately, Judge Hoffman was criticized by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeal for several of his actions, which seemed to proliferate once he
allowed his personal opinions and biases to invade the courtroom.19 The
Seventh Circuit found that Judge Hoffman’s personal entanglement in the
trial was so significant that all impartiality had been eroded, ultimately
requiring the reversal of all convictions.20
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 8.
15. See id. at 4, 7; see also Pnina Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial
Discretion, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1327, 1332 (2000) (“Judge Julius Jennings Hoffman matured to
become a strong supporter of and generous contributor to the Republican Party.”); see also
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 9, at 392 (“His legal rulings were one-sidedly in favor of the
government.”).
16. Lahav, supra note 15, at 1345.
17. See id. at 1340–41 (discussing Judge Hoffman’s knowledge of his public figure status in
light of statements made before the Chicago Eight Trial).
18. One commentator described Judge Hoffman’s errors as found by the Seventh Circuit:
He hauled lawyers halfway across the country and threw them in jail, thus provoking
demonstrations by hundreds of other lawyers. He showed poor judgment in not allowing
Bobby Seale to be represented by counsel of his choice, who needed a few weeks to
recover from surgery. He showed even worse judgment by gagging and chaining the
Black Panther leader, thus giving rise to cries of racism. . . . He excluded defense
witnesses, such as former attorney general Ramsey Clark and civil rights leader Ralph
Abernathy. He demonstrated, better than any lawyer’s arguments, his own obvious bias
against the defendants and their lawyers.
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 9, at 392.
19. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 396–97 (7th Cir. 1972) (noting the attorneys’ conduct
was the “product[] of actual prejudice toward them on the part of the trial judge”); see also United
States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1972) (describing Judge Hoffman’s assurances after
opening statements that, on the sole basis that defense attorney Kunstler had an appearance for all
defendants on file, their rights were not abridged); see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 9, at 392
(summarizing the effect of Judge Hoffman’s opinions and biases on the outcome of the case).
20. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 396–97 (“The record reveals that [the attorneys’] conduct
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The Chicago Eight represented nonconformance and individuality.
Though often regarded as “disrespectful and contemptuous,”21 the
defendants were adamant that they would not be passive casualties of the
American judicial system. In the end, their passion and perseverance led
to their success. Simply put, “the personalities overpowered the issues.”22
Accordingly, Judge Hoffman’s courtroom is best remembered not only
for the political issues that were raised, but for Judge Hoffman’s failure
to rise to the challenge of ethically and responsibly controlling the trial.
Perhaps no one could have controlled the chaos of the courtroom, but
Judge Hoffman failed spectacularly in his efforts to do so. His actions and
inactions provide an important case example showing the need for clear
codes of judicial conduct. In the heat of the moment, judges, like lawyers,
must be guided by standards, not ego.
Sadly, there are still too many judges with Judge Hoffman tendencies.
In November 2018, a Pennsylvania judge was removed for her
gratuitously sarcastic and disparaging statements about defense
counsel.23 At nearly the same time, a New York judge told a litigant that
he “symbolizes everything that’s wrong with the world,”24 and a
Wisconsin judge threatened to hold in contempt and incarcerate an
assistant public defender for “acting like [the judge was] some kind of
idiot.”25 Judges acting injudicious does not occur exclusively in highprofile cases. It also happens to everyday litigants and, now, on different
platforms. Social media sites have opened the avenues for judges to
launch their vitriol.26
tended to be productive of actual prejudice toward them on the part of the trial judge. . . .
Accordingly . . . we conclude that all 9 contemnors must be tried before another judge.”); see also
Seale, 461 F.2d at 350 (“[T]he defendant is entitled to a hearing before a judge other than the one
he has reviled.”).
21. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 9, at 391.
22. Id. at 394.
23. Commonwealth v. McCauley, 199 A.3d 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); see also Debra Cassens
Weiss, Court Removes Judge from Child Rape Case, Citing Opinion Sarcasm and ‘Personal
Animus’, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 29, 2018, 12:12 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/citing
_judges_opinion_sarcasm_and_personal_animus_court_removes_judge_from/ (noting the judge’s
“demonstrated bias and personal animus”).
24. Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Who Told Litigant He ‘Symbolizes Everything That’s Wrong
with the World’ Is Tossed from Case, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 20, 2018, 7:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_who_told_litigant_he_symbolizes_everything_tha
ts_wrong_with_the_world.
25. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Orders Detention of Public Defender for ‘Acting Like I’m
Some Kind of Idiot’, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 30, 2018, 4:11 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/judge_orders_detention_of_public_defender_for_acting_like_im_some_kind_of_i/
(noting this was not the first time the judge had detained an attorney for contempt).
26. See, e.g., Joseph Serna, State Censures 2 Judicial Officers for Court Conduct, Including
One for Online Rants About Immigrants, Gays and Obama, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018, 11:30
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-cjp-judges-censure-20180831-story.html
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A key reason to revisit Judge Hoffman’s behavior in the Chicago Eight
Trial is so that we can appreciate why it was critical to establish codes of
conduct for judges and to recommit to enforcing those codes. Therefore,
after examining the trial and Judge Hoffman’s background, this Article
focuses on the evolution of ethical standards addressing when a judge
should recuse himself for having a bias in a case. Judge Hoffman had an
agenda for the trial; the ethical rules require the exact opposite. Judges
must remain impartial, and if they cannot, they must not judge a case.
I. THE CHICAGO EIGHT TRIAL: “UNPRECEDENTED” COURTROOM
CONFLICT
The year was 1968, the height of the Vietnam War.27 That year, it
became evident that the United States government had no intention of
retreating from Vietnam after the costly and tragic Tet Offensive.28 The
United States intended to remain in the region until it achieved its
objectives, however unclear those may have been to the American
public.29 It was this apparent sense of colonialism and intervention that
sparked thousands of protesters to disrupt the 1968 Democratic National
Convention in Chicago, Illinois. While government supporters saw the
protests as riotous and criminal, a large segment of the public was aghast
that the police would silence a crowd that was attempting to combat “the
merciless oversights of American political process—war, racism, and
poverty.”30 The government’s attack on that crowd became a symbolic
example of police brutality against those fighting for justice against an
unjust government.
Eight men were charged with conspiracy against the United States,
unlawful demonstrations of incendiary devices, and crossing state lines
to incite a riot.31 All eight were alleged to have led the violent protests at
(describing the judge’s conduct as “posting far-right memes on Facebook, railing against
immigrants, gays and Muslims and claiming that former President Obama was trying to convert the
nation to Islam” and noting the judge was banned from seeking election to judicial office for life).
27. Edwin Moise, Opinion, The Tet Offensive Was Just the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/opinion/vietnam-war-tet-offensive-start.html.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Mark Atwood Lawrence, Opinion, Was the Vietnam War Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/opinion/vietnam-war-necessary.html?rref
=collection%2Fcolumn%2FVietnam%20%2767&action=click&contentCollection=Opinion&mo
dule=Collection&region=Marginalia&src=me&version=column&pgtype=article
(describing
countervailing assessments of the decision to remain in Vietnam); see also Christian Appy, Why
Don’t Americans Know What Really Happened in Vietnam?, NATION (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-dont-americans-know-what-really-happened-vietnam
(noting the long-term sanitization of the Vietnam War in Americans’ collective memory).
30. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 10.
31. Id. at 9 (“[Defendants] were charged with ‘conspiracy’ and with individually crossing state
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the Democratic National Convention.32 More notably, these defendants
were antigovernment activists. For example, Abbott “Abbie” Hoffman
and Jerry Rubin were the cofounders of the Youth International Party, or
the “Yippies.”33 The Yippies were responsible for numerous incidents of
civil disobedience, including staged chaos at the New York Stock
Exchange34 and a public exorcism of the Pentagon building.35 Another
defendant, Bobby Seale, was a notable public figure for his role within
the Black Panther Party.36 All of the defendants, though ostensibly
fighting for peace and equality, believed that they had to call attention to
the issues by bringing their conflict to the forefront. Injustice would be
fought with strength and fortitude. As Abbie Hoffman put it, “I always
held my flower in a clenched fist.”37
The trial amassed a great deal of political controversy, as it pitted “two
sides of a deep cultural division”38 against each other. Each side in the
Chicago Eight Trial knew that its success depended upon its portrayal of
the other to the jury. On one side, the government downplayed the idea
of the “youth movement,” instead focusing on eight adult males running
through the streets of Chicago promoting turmoil.39 On the other hand,
the defendants attempted to portray themselves as true patriots in the
pursuit of justice.40 They were, they believed, a collective of impassioned
activists coming together for the greater good.41
lines and making speeches with intent to ‘incite, organize, promote and encourage’ riots in Chicago
during the Democratic convention in August, 1968.”).
32. Id.
33. John T. McQuiston, Abbie Hoffman, 60’s Icon, Dies; Yippie Movement Founder Was 52,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/14/obituaries/abbie-hoffman-60s-icon-dies-yippie-movement-founder-was-52.html; Eric Pace, Jerry Rubin, 56, Flashy 60’s
Radical, Dies; ‘Yippies’ Founder and Chicago 7 Defendant, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/30/obituaries/jerry-rubin-56-flashy-60-s-radical-dies-yippiesfounder-and-chicago-7-defendant.html.
34. McQuiston, supra note 33 (“[Hoffman was] throwing dollar bills on the floor of the New
York Stock Exchange.”).
35. Judy Gumbo, Celebrating the March and Levitation of the Pentagon, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct.
26, 2017), https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/10/26/celebrating-the-march-and-levitation-ofthe-pentagon.
36. See SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 37–38 (noting Bobby Seale’s station in the Black Panther
Party).
37. McQuiston, supra note 33.
38. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 399.
39. Id. at 198 (“‘He isn’t Abbie,’ Richard Schultz objected, ‘he’s a thirty-three-year-old man
who should be called Mr. Hoffman.’”).
40. BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, THE CHICAGO SEVEN: 1960S RADICALISM IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 6 (2008) (“The trial became for the defense an opportunity to portray the dissent
movement that had converged on Chicago for the Democratic Convention.”).
41. Id. at 1 (“The defendants and their lawyers used the courtroom as a platform for a broad
critique of American society and an almost anarchic challenge to the legitimacy of governmental
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The net result was the politicization of the trial itself. The formalities
of courtroom conduct were ignored.42 The defendants reveled in
hijacking the proceedings43 while their lawyers sat quietly as though they
implicitly approved. Jurors laughed at snarky remarks,44 and observers in
the courtroom became participants as the defendants yelled at the judge.45
As the Seventh Circuit noted on appeal, the courtroom conflict, including
verbal attacks on the judge, was “unprecedented.”46
Throughout all of these contentious moments during trial, one moment
overshadowed the others: the binding and gagging of Bobby Seale. Seale
had made continuous efforts to be heard regarding his request for counsel
of his choice.47 However, the judge was unmoved. He warned Seale to
remain quiet during the proceedings until, after several warnings, he had
the court marshals handcuff Seale to a chair and gag him so that he could
no longer speak.48 The judge’s decision sparked frenzy in the courtroom
and in the media.49 The Chicago Eight Trial continued, however, and the
proceedings remained tense. As one commentator remarked,
Only a lawyer examining a witness, or a lawyer objecting to something
said or done, or a marshal guarding aisles or entrances, felt the clear
right to stand erect. . . . The defendants scurried around their table to
confer with one another as if the air above their heads were filled with
flying bullets.50

The courtroom was not merely the site of a judicial proceeding—it was
a battleground for a war of emotion, attacks on character, and declarations
of fundamental beliefs.51
The judge attempted to issue an emphatic farewell at the conclusion of
the proceedings. In a grandiose display of authority, the judge cited over
authority.”).
42. See id. at 37.
43. Id. at 134 (“On the morning of October 15, David Dellinger began reading from the list of
war dead on both sides, for the Moratorium Against the Viet Nam War. The marshals, in a brief
tug-of-war with Abbie Hoffman, removed the Viet Cong flag draped over the defense table.”).
44. Id. at 172.
45. See id. at 255, 302 (providing a transcript of the proceedings during those events).
46. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 396 (7th Cir. 1972) (“Here the trial judge was the recipient
of numerous and unprecedented attacks and insults by both trial counsel.”).
47. Bobby Seale and the other defendants had planned to be represented by Charles Garry, a
renowned defense lawyer. Garry had successfully defended similarly situated defendants on
multiple occasions. However, Garry had undergone a surgical procedure for his gallbladder, which
his doctor deemed life-threatening, just before the trial. Judge Hoffman denied a six-week
continuance so that Garry could represent the defendants. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 42.
48. Id. at 62–63.
49. See id. at 63–64.
50. Id. at 121.
51. Id. at 117 (“People paying a visit to the trial for the first time generally remarked on, and
felt, the nightmarish emotional involvement of everyone present . . . .”).
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150 contempt charges for the defendants and their lawyers, a move which
was challenged on appeal to the Seventh Circuit.52 Ultimately, the
contempt convictions made their way to the court of appeal and were set
aside, while the case was remanded for trial by a different judge.53 The
appellate court excoriated Judge Hoffman for his handling of the case and
for telegraphing his contempt for the defense to the jury.54 Judge
Hoffman had one job to do—provide a fair trial to both sides. He failed
to do that. He became an advocate and adversary rather than a fair
decision maker.
The Chicago Eight Trial put a spotlight on judicial conduct, and what
the public saw was not a pretty picture. It saw a judge who was guided
by his own grudges and emotion, not by clear standards of ethical judicial
conduct.
II. WHO WAS JUDGE HOFFMAN?
Judge Hoffman’s behavior in the Chicago Eight Trial was not out of
character for how he generally conducted his courtroom. Julius Jennings
Hoffman was appointed by President Eisenhower in 1953 as a district
court judge in the Northern District of Illinois.55 A traditionalist in the
courtroom, seventy-four-year-old Hoffman was known for “forc[ing]
cases to conclusion by arm-twisting with technicalities.”56 From behind
the bench, he was regarded as bitterly unforgiving, 57 and he was
continually scrutinized for his “remarkably lively” 58 yet “arrogant and
pompous”59 demeanor.60 Judge Hoffman had a tendency to ensure that
he had the last word on any matter, often saving the finishing remark as
a subtle jab at a defendant’s character or an attorney’s competence.61
52. Id. at 372.
53. Id. at 376.
54. RAGSDALE, supra note 40 at 7, 9.
55. Pamela Reeves, Julius Hoffman: On the Bench, WASH. POST, May 28, 1972, at M8; Judge
Julius J. Hoffman, 87, Dies; President at Trial of the Chicago 7, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 1983),
https://www.nytimes.com/1983/07/02/obituaries/judge-julius-j-hoffman-87-dies-president-attrial-of-the-chicago-7.html.
56. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 6.
57. In one anecdote, a law clerk for Judge Hoffman was said to have told the judge that the
denial of a motion would be unfair. The judge subsequently fired him. Id.
58. Id. at 3.
59. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 9, at 392.
60. See SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 4 (“Judge Hoffman was described by persons both friendly
and familiar with him as needing someone to pick on.”); see also Lahav, supra note 15, 1346–47
(noting that Judge Hoffman had authoritarian tendencies and his fear of anarchy made him
“progressively more rigid and less flexible in the exercise of his judicial powers”).
61. See SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 8 (“[Judge Hoffman] showed that his central weakness, his
raw nerve, was that he had to have the last word.”); see also id. at 167 (quoting a conversation
between Judge Hoffman and defense lawyer Kunstler).
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Most significantly, perhaps, he ran a despotic courtroom, regarding
himself as “the governor” of all proceedings in his courtroom62 and
brandishing his authority when overruling attorneys on undemanding and
insignificant motions.
To understand Judge Hoffman’s absolute sense of authority, one must
understand Judge Hoffman’s perception of his role in society. He
believed that he had the right and duty to serve a bigger cause of
patriotism, in an effort to fight anti-Semitism, by serving as a judge.63
Seeing himself as the standard bearer, Judge Hoffman elevated his rulings
from mere adjudications in a courtroom to profound lessons for the legal
profession and society.64 Hoffman was also determined to be a loyalist to
the American government. He regularly ruled in favor of the United
States and had an “unrelenting faith in the Justice Department.”65 He had
no use for parties that challenged the establishment. For example,
“[w]hen the American Civil Liberties Union tried to enter an Amicus brief
in the [Chicago Eight] case, Judge Hoffman declared, ‘I’m not running a
school for civil rights.’”66 For Judge Hoffman, it was important to pick a
side in a criminal case and make sure justice was done.
The Chicago Eight Trial provided the ideal platform for Judge
Hoffman to demonstrate his abiding commitment to the government. In
the midst of a war that challenged the long-established foundations of the
American government, he had the opportunity to remind the American
public that institutionalism was alive and well. He could silence the
activists with one swift ruling, demonstrating that there are consequences
for those who challenge the status quo.67
While it is unclear whether Judge Hoffman wanted to preside over the
Chicago Eight Trial or was randomly assigned to it,68 one thing is known:
He had the opportunity to recuse himself69 due to a purported conflict of
62. See Lahav, supra note 15, at 1346 n.57.
63. Id. at 1341 (quoting Judge Hoffman: “When a Jew administers the law excellently he also
administers an antidote to anti-Semitism.”).
64. Id. at 1341 n.43 (“Judge Hoffman may have understood the significance of such a trial in
the eyes of the public, and yet not have observed the principle in practice.”).
65. SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 6.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 370–73.
68. Though Judge Hoffman vehemently reminded the parties throughout the trial that “[he]
didn’t ask for this case,” several commentators have insisted that he requested it perhaps because
of its notoriety and implications. Id. at 4.
69. See, e.g., Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (“All of such cases, however,
present difficult questions for the judge. All we can say upon the whole matter is that where
conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or private right,
a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching
from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place.”).
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interest but declined to do so.70 The trial became his cause, and Judge
Hoffman had a mission. By overseeing the government’s prosecution of
eight antiwar, antigovernment activists, the public would witness Judge
Hoffman as the loyal American prepared to quash the revolution.71
III. THE JUDGE’S MISSTEPS AND THE LAW’S INADEQUACIES
Judge Hoffman was criticized on appeal for two principal errors in his
handling of the case.72 First, Judge Hoffman critically misused his
powers of contempt. He summarily announced the contempt charges at
each of the defendants’ (and their lawyers’) last respective appearances
instead of citing the charges as they arose. 73 Judge Hoffman could have
acted instantly by citing immediate contempt charges or removing the
disruptive defendants from the courtroom.74 Instead, he berated the
defendants and counsel. Then, he sat in judgment of their alleged
contemptuous behavior at the end of trial. As a result, several of those
contempt charges were reversed on appeal as a matter of law because they
were seemingly motivated by personal animus.75 Long before the
Chicago Eight Trial, it was established law that because “[t]he power of
contempt which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and
orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and
dignity of the court is most important and indispensable. . . . The judge
70. Judge Hoffman was a substantial stockholder in the Brunswick Corporation, which profited
tremendously from American defense spending. In a prior case, Judge Hoffman had recused
himself on these grounds. However, upon a motion by the defense in this case, Hoffman declined
to recuse himself. The defendants suggested that there was “a conflict of interest for him in facing
defendants whose adult lives had been devoted to antiwar activity.” SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 6–
7.
71. “[Judge Hoffman] talked more and more in his chambers about the defendants’ ‘plans’ to
disrupt the trial, with a tone and attitude as if he already thought they were guilty of contempt.” Id.
at 8.
72. The binding and gagging of Bobby Seale was not considered judicial misconduct on appeal
to the Seventh Circuit because of the Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970). Seale v. United States, 461 F.2d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1972). The decision, however, by Judge
Hoffman to physically restrain Seale still had strong repercussions, as it proved to be a source of
profound issues of racism during the trial. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 9, at 392.
73. “[I]f the conduct of the defendant includes a personal attack on the trial judge carrying such
potential for bias that he is not ‘likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair
adjudication’ the trial judge must disqualify himself if he waits to act until the conclusion of the
trial. When the trial proceedings have terminated, the need to proceed summarily is not present.”
In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1972) (citation omitted) (quoting Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971)).
74. See, e.g., Seale, 461 F.2d at 351 (explaining that Judge Hoffman could have cited the
contempt charges against Bobby Seale immediately after they occurred).
75. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 400 (holding that some of the contempt specifications did not
“charge conduct which rises to the level of an ‘obstruct[ion] [of] the administration of justice.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1971)).
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must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal.”76 Judge Hoffman
abused the power of contempt and, consequently, his role as a judge.
Second, Judge Hoffman erred by refusing to hear Seale’s objections to
his counsel, thereby denying Seale his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.77 Many of Bobby Seale’s outbursts
during trial came because of Seale’s frustration in not being able to be
represented by counsel of his choice.78 Seale objected to his forced
representation and eventually attempted to appear pro se.79 The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that although a defendant is not automatically entitled to
alternate counsel, the judge had a duty, at a minimum, to allow Seale to
be heard.80 By prejudging matters, Judge Hoffman violated one of his
most basic duties—providing a fair and open forum for a party to present
his or her arguments.
It is likely that the trial would have been entirely different “had the trial
judge been a dignified, fair, and self-confident jurist”81 who adhered to
the rules relating to contemptuous courtroom behavior. Regardless, legal
inadequacies allowed Judge Hoffman to preside over the trial. A principal
inadequacy that plagued the judicial system, and likely this case, was the
broad “duty to sit.”82 The federal system required that judges continue to
preside over a case except in the rarest of situations: when one of three
recusal statutes was satisfied.83 However, only one of those statutes was
relevant to Judge Hoffman.84 At the time of the trial, as it does today, 28
U.S.C. § 144 read as follows:
76. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
77. See Seale, 461 F.2d at 360 (explaining that “[Judge Hoffman] had a duty to inquire of
Seale . . . as to his objections to counsel of record and to take appropriate action to make sure that
his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel and his right to represent himself were
appropriately honored”).
78. Charles Garry was expected to be the lead attorney in the representation of all defendants.
However, his gallbladder procedure, deemed immediately necessary by his doctor, ensured that he
could not represent Seale or the other defendants. This was a huge blow to Seale. Charles Garry
was a renowned lawyer who “had successfully defended Panthers in difficult cases in California.”
SCHULTZ, supra note 3, at 40.
79. Seale, 461 F.2d at 359.
80. Id. at 356–57.
81. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 9, at 393.
82. See Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964) (“It is a judge’s duty
to refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason
for recusation.”); see also United States v. Ming, 466 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1972) (“A trial
judge has as much obligation not to recuse himself when there is no occasion for him to do so as
there is for him to do so when the converse prevails.”).
83. See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3541 (3d
ed. 2008) (listing the three federal recusal statutes as § 455, § 47, and § 144 of Title 28).
84. Id. 28 U.S.C § 455 called for a judge’s recusal only in situations involving conflicts of
interest. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). 28 U.S.C. § 47 deals only with a judge recusing himself or herself
upon hearing an appeal from a case that he or she already tried. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83.
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Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.85

In 1966, the United States Supreme Court addressed the mechanics of
the statute. The Court held that “[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be
disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case.”86 Judge Hoffman’s deep disdain for
the defendants was homegrown. It was principally the occurrences in the
courtroom that molded Judge Hoffman’s personal opinions. His
unwavering biases arose out of a strictly judicial source—the trial which
took place before him. Statutory recusal requirements, such as 28 U.S.C.
§ 144, were no substitute for an explicit ethical code to guide the judge’s
behavior.
Also of little guidance at the time were the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
promulgated by the Committee on Judicial Ethics in 1924. The Canons
simply stated, “A judge’s official conduct should be free from
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety,”87 a wholly subjective
standard by which the decision to “withdraw in a particular case was in
the eyes of the beholder, the judge.”88 For a jurist like Judge Hoffman,
the only impropriety would have been if he had shirked what he saw as
his duty to teach the defense a lesson. But one commentator noted the
difficulty of self-diagnosing such biases:
Jurists’ perceptions of their own impartiality also suffer from the
failure to acknowledge the existence of unconscious motivations.
Human psychology complicates assessments of impartiality. Bias is
notoriously difficult to recognize within ourselves. Psychological
studies have repeatedly confirmed that individuals may harbor
unconscious stereotypes, beliefs, biases, and prejudices.89

The systemic flaw, then, is evident: Judges are susceptible to personal
prejudices, not necessarily because they are unjust, but because they too
are human. Yet, as discussed below in Part IV, the law has begun to adapt
85. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012).
86. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966).
87. Gabriel D. Serbulea, Comment, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for
Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1121 n.86 (2011) (citing JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE
OF JUSTICE 190 (1974)).
88. M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of Propriety
Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 47 (2005).
89. Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 181, 206 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
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in accordance with developments in psychology and other fields to
incorporate these discreet instincts.
The defendants’ behavior during the Chicago Eight Trial was certainly
inappropriate for a courtroom.90 But Judge Hoffman had an “arsenal”91
available to him in handling the courtroom theatrics.92 His overarching
misstep was in personalizing his role in ensuring justice.93 At the same
time, though, the law failed by allowing it.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAWS ON CONTEMPT AND RECUSAL
At the time of the Chicago Eight Trial, judges had too narrow of a lens
on their ethical responsibilities. The focus was simply on statutory
recusal. However, since the time of that trial, the lessons of the Chicago
Eight Trial have impacted the evolution of judicial ethics both in case law
and ethical codes.
Within a year of the Chicago Eight Trial’s conclusion, the Supreme
Court confronted a separate incident of disobedient defendants in
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania.94 The Court clarified the law regarding the
handling of summary contempt charges: “Where . . . [a judge] does not
act the instant the contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the
trial, on balance, it is generally wise where the marks of the unseemly

90. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 362 (7th Cir. 1972) (explaining “the rulings of a trial
judge, no matter how sincerely felt to be or in fact indefensible, cannot excuse contumacious
protestation”).
91. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463 (1971) (“As these separate acts or outbursts
took place, the arsenal of authority described in Allen was available to the trial judge to keep order
in the courtroom.”).
92. With regard to judicial demeanor and the handling of difficult situations in court, much can
be learned from our foreign colleagues. In their article, Performing Impartiality: Judicial
Demeanor and Legitimacy, Professors Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu offer important
observations regarding effective courtroom control. First, judges should be, as required by the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, “patient, dignified and courteous to litigants . . . and others.”
Kathy Mack & Sharyn Roach Anleu, Performing Impartiality: Judicial Demeanor and Legitimacy,
35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 137, 141 (2010). However, the real challenge is how a judge who is
provoked and angry should act. Citing Gregory O’Brien’s Confessions of an Angry Judge, the
article identifies stress points on judges and alternative ways for the court to react to these stressors.
Id. For example, the article discusses using compliments rather than scolding, or listening more and
talking less. Id. At the time of the Chicago Eight Trial there were no national studies or monitoring
of judicial behavior. The model of the courtroom was that the judge, by virtue of his status, decided
how he would interact with the parties and counsel. However, after cases like the Chicago Eight
Trial, legal communities nationally and internationally have come to understand how judicial
demeanor does not just affect the atmosphere in the courtroom but also interpretations of whether
the court reached the right decision or was improperly influenced by a lack of impartiality.
93. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 396 (7th Cir. 1972) (reasoning “[t]hese attacks would have
affected any judge personally. For example, no judge could remain impartial . . . after the judge’s
honesty and integrity were assailed.”).
94. 400 U.S. 455.
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conduct have left personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place.”95
The Seventh Circuit’s review of the Chicago Eight Trial occurred just
three years after the Mayberry decision. The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the Mayberry decision, had it been controlling at the
time of the Chicago Eight trial, would have prevented Judge Hoffman
from exercising the ample contempt charges at the conclusion of the
trial.96
Further, in the 1970s, American jurisprudence almost harmoniously
shifted to focus on implementing an objective standard of recusal. In
1972, the American Bar Association adopted a comprehensive Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.97 Then, in 1973, the Judicial Conference
promulgated the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.98 Serving as
a judiciary guide for federal judges, the Code of Conduct established an
objective standard for recusal99 which mirrored that of the American Bar
Association.100 In 1974, a similar objective standard was adopted under
28 U.S.C. § 455,101 thereby eliminating the previously imposed “duty to
sit.”102 The statute provided, “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of
the United States should disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”103 Since then, the
95. Id. at 463–64.
96. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1972) (“We have no doubt that the
able trial judge would have asked another judge to preside at Seale’s contempt hearing if Mayberry
had been handed down before the contempt citation date.”); see also In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at
394–95 (providing a brief analysis of the Chicago Eight trial under Mayberry and noting that Judge
Hoffman should have been disqualified because there was a high potential for bias).
97. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998).
98. Richard K. Neumann Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote
Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 & n.66 (2003).
99. Canon 2A provides, “An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with
knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that
the judge’s honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired.”
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, GUIDE
TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES Canon 2A (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_march_12_2019.pdf
[hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT].
100. Canon 3E(1) read: “A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which
the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3E (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972).
101. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 3541 (noting that the statute, which was first enacted
in 1792, was completely rewritten in 1974, and now serves as the basic provision on disqualification
of federal judges).
102. See M. Margaret McKeown, To Judge or Not to Judge: Transparency and Recusal in the
Federal System, 30 REV. LITIG. 653, 661–62 (2011) (“As Justice William Rehnquist noted in a
1972 memorandum decision explaining his determination not to recuse in a particular case, the duty
to sit became accepted by all circuit courts.” (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., mem.))).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
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statute has been revised so that a judge “shall,” not “should,” disqualify
himself in situations of impropriety. 104 The linguistic shift demonstrates
an ongoing emphasis on mandatory recusal, perhaps motivated by an
aversion to situations like the one presented in the Chicago Eight Trial.
Today, the law has evolved to fully embrace the notion that once a judge
can be objectively perceived as having a personal stake in the outcome of
a case, he should recuse himself.105 Ninth Circuit Judge M. Margaret
McKeown noted the great advantages of the objective standard:
In addition to promoting public confidence, the appearance standard
is a practical solution to the difficult situation that arises when a litigant
suspects actual bias or impropriety and accuses the judge of
impropriety. Imagine the treacherous situation were litigants forced in
every instance to offer evidence of actual impropriety. Refocusing the
debate on the appearance of impropriety relieves pressure on all
concerned and serves as a useful conflict avoidance principle. . . . [A]
litigant can give voice to concerns without going nuclear by accusing
the judge of being unethical.106

As a result, Section 455 affords protections to defendants like the
Chicago Eight because it demands recusal rather than suggests it.
In 1994, the Supreme Court addressed another controversial limitation
on recusal: the extrajudicial source doctrine originating from Section 144.
Previously, the “personal bias or prejudice” would only demand recusal
when the judge had garnered improper motives from a source beyond the
walls of the courtroom.107 In Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court
proclaimed that the extrajudicial source, while relevant as a factor, is not
dispositive for bias or prejudice.108 Thus, Judge Hoffman would likely
have been under a statutory duty to recuse himself because of the
immense bias which was “so extreme as to display clear inability to
104. Id. See McKeown, supra note 88, at 47 (“The key change in 1990 was to replace ‘should’
with ‘shall’ to reflect the mandatory nature of the standards.”).
105. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 99, at Canon 3C(1)(a). See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009) (“The failure to consider objective standards requiring recusal
is not consistent with the imperatives of due process” and concluding that the circumstances in the
case created a “possible temptation to the average . . . judge.” (omission in original) (quoting Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986))); United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1324
(8th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he risk of a perception of judicial bias or partiality is sufficiently great so that
our proper course is to order reassignment on remand.”); United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 155–
56 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Put simply, avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important in
developing public confidence in our judicial system as avoiding impropriety itself.”).
106. McKeown, supra note 88, at 54–55.
107. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544–45 (1994).
108. Id. at 554 (“Since neither the presence of an extrajudicial source necessarily establishes
bias, nor the absence of an extrajudicial source necessarily precludes bias, it would be better to
speak of the existence of a significant (and often determinative) ‘extrajudicial source’ factor, than
of an ‘extrajudicial source’ doctrine, in recusal jurisprudence.”).
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render fair judgment.”109
Today’s ethical standards also condemn the manner in which Judge
Hoffman responded to Bobby Seale.110 Canon 3A(4) provides, “A judge
should accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding,
and that person’s lawyer, the full right to be heard . . . .”111 Additionally,
the Code provides: “A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity.”112 Perhaps it takes a case like the
Chicago Eight Trial for judges to understand why there should be explicit
ethical rules governing judicial behavior. Deferring to an individual
judge’s perception of what might be the right thing to do in a situation
will never provide the protection that a clear standard of behavior can
promote.
Thus, American jurisprudence has made considerable progress in
ensuring that judges cannot exercise unfettered discretion from behind
the bench. The law has shifted to highlight, and often mandate,
impartiality from a decision maker. Ethical standards have become
flexible with factor tests and reasonableness standards that conform to the
circumstances. The law has thus aimed to uphold a valuable proposition
set forth in Tumey v. Ohio:
[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear,
and true . . . denies the latter due process of law.113

Codifying this proposition into clear terms is something that continues.
Yet, even today, the advisory opinions in the Guide to Judiciary Policy
109. Id. at 551.
110. Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides generally: “A judge
should perform the duties of the office fairly, impartially and diligently.” CODE OF CONDUCT, supra
note 99, at Canon 3.
111. Id. at Canon 3A(4). The notion that a litigant has the right to be heard is echoed throughout
American jurisprudence. See, e.g., In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1038 n.2 (Fla.
1994) (citing MATTHEW HALE, LORD HALE’S RULES FOR HIS JUDICIAL GUIDANCE: THINGS
NECESSARY TO BE CONTINUALLY HAD IN REMEMBRANCE) (advising that a judge avoid
prejudging cases and withhold judgment until all parties are heard); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET
AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 2.07 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHICS] (“A litigant’s right to the assistance of counsel has been the subject of numerous
disciplinary cases.”); Gordon J. Beggs, Challenges in Judging: Some Insights from the Writings of
Moses, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 145, 149 (1996) (“The sense that one has been heard is an important
aspect of the judicial process.”).
112. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 99, at Canon 3A(3).
113. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
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may still not go far enough in preventing or responding to the types of
situations Judge Hoffman’s behavior raised in the Chicago Eight Trial.
Out of the 115 published advisory opinions, none of them deal with a
judge’s demeanor on the bench. Moreover, judges who openly express
annoyance with a case still do not think that such concerns require them
to recuse themselves.114 They may be correct in that assessment, but the
potential that they will act in a biased manner while on the bench is high.
The hard decision is knowing when a judge has been so influenced by his
or her disdain for a case or a party to realize that, objectively, the judge
cannot be impartial in the matter. Equally important, is how the judge
must behave in order to ensure that bias does not affect the proceedings
if the judge stays on the case. The next step in learning from the Chicago
Eight Trial should be to tackle the problem of judicial demeanor by better
educating and training judges, and creating effective remedies for when
problems arise.115
114. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Federal Judge Who Said He Wouldn’t Wish Case on His Worst
Enemy Refuses to Recuse Himself, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 18, 2017, 3:35 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judge_who_said_he_wouldnt_wish_case_on_his
_worst_enemy_refuses_to_r/ (quoting the judge as saying his comments, though mistakenly made,
“do not demonstrate bias against the plaintiff but rather frustration at irresolution of the action”).
115. The topic of judicial demeanor has been increasingly discussed within legal scholarship.
See, e.g., Maxine D. Goodman, Shame, Angry Judges, and the Social Media Effect, 63 CATH. U.
L. REV. 589, 623 (2014) (“[T]he time has come to revolutionize conceptions of judicial discipline,
modify past assumptions, and take seriously the task of determining whether public sanctions serve
to correct the misbehavior of angry judges.”); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating
Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 497, 536 (2009) (“The enforcement of norms governing judges’ courtroom demeanor
marks a sea change from the early days when judges’ personal independence to administer judicial
proceedings as they saw fit was taken for granted . . . .”); Harold T. Kelly Jr., Hart Failure: The
Supreme Judicial Court’s Interpretation of Nonjudicial Demeanor, 44 ME. L. REV. 175, 177 (1992)
(“The judge who holds himself accountable to those who empower him is the judge who is willing
to respect not only the law, but other people as well.”); Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 1205, 1284 (2012) (“We cannot get away with ignoring [judicial anger].”); Terry A.
Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485, 1501 (2011)
(summarizing “that judges experience emotions that they must regulate, that such regulation is
difficult, and that they are given no guidance on how to carry it out”); Roger J. Miner, Judicial
Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2004)
(arguing that “[t]he major cause of the loss of public confidence in the American judiciary . . . is
the failure of judges to comply with established professional norms, including rules of conduct”);
Patrick J. Monahan Jr., Demeanor and Judicial Ethics, N.J. LAW., June 1996, at 29, 32 (explaining
that a judge’s duty requires “conducting oneself in such a way that the participants and onlookers
are not only not offended by the judge’s conduct but have no reasonable doubt that justice is being
done”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) (“Many federal
judges have departed from their earlier attitudes; they have dropped the relatively disinterested pose
to adopt a more active, ‘managerial’ stance.”). Many commentators argue that rules of judicial
conduct provide a valuable platform for promoting judicial propriety, and thus the revision of those
rules to incorporate developments in the regulation of judicial conduct is necessary. That is, the
judicial codes are valuable if they prove applicable for judges. See, e.g., McKeown, supra note 88,
at 58 (“[I]mposing accountability through rules of judicial ethics that include avoiding the

896

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

V. GUIDING JUDICIAL DEMEANOR FROM BEHIND THE BENCH
Canon 3A(2) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges reflects
“the judge’s unique role as exemplar and guardian of the dignity of the
court.”116 It reads, “A judge should hear and decide matters assigned,
unless disqualified, and should maintain order and decorum in all judicial
proceedings.”117 At the time of the Chicago Eight Trial, few judges had
ever been sanctioned for violations relating to courtroom demeanor.118
The ethical guidelines on courtroom decorum had not yet been
developed, so judges were generally given a broad scope of authority.
When confronted with contemptuous defendants, for instance, judges
were free to allow their emotions to control their remarks. In fact, the
Seventh Circuit did not even address Judge Hoffman’s courtroom
demeanor as an issue during the Chicago Eight Trial.119
Consistent with developments in judicial ethics as a whole, there has
been a shift to emphasize proper courtroom demeanor since the 1970s.120
Judges have been publicly admonished or disciplined for behaviors far
less egregious than those of Judge Hoffman in the Chicago Eight Trial.121
For example, a trial judge in Washington was admonished for playing
music in an effort to “relieve the tension.”122 Despite making an effort to
improve the courtroom’s atmosphere, the judge was found to have
“disregard[ed] . . . the required solemnity and dignity of the
proceeding.”123
While some jurisdictions now have mechanisms to report judicial
misconduct,124 including abusive judicial demeanor, the debate continues
as to what will be the most effective tools for disciplining abusive judges
and altering their behavior. For federal judges like Judge Hoffman, the
appearance of impropriety is a small price to pay for the honor and responsibility of serving as a
judge.”); Nancy L. Sholes, Note, Judicial Ethics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379,
406 (1992) (explaining that clear interpretation of general judicial principles is necessary for “the
overall integrity of the court”).
116. JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, supra note 111, § 3.02.
117. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 99, at Canon 3A(2).
118. See JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, supra note 111, § 3.02.
119. The opinions referred only to the demeanor of the defendants and their lawyers in relation
to their contempt charges. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1972); see also United
States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 362–64 (7th Cir. 1972).
120. The ABA Model Code, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, and many state
judicial ethics codes have adopted canons or guidelines based on courtroom decorum and propriety.
121. See JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, supra note 111, § 3.02(1) n.5.
122. Id. § 3.02.
123. Id.
124. Complaints of misconduct by a federal judge may be sent to the relevant office or
courthouse, as found on the website for United States Courts. State courts’ websites indicate a
variety of methods for filing a complaint, from mailing a letter to filling out an electronic form.
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ultimate sanction would be impeachment;125 but that is not likely,126 and
judges know it.127 Nor should it take such extreme measures to ensure
that judges act respectfully on the bench. As we consider these
alternatives, we can consider the question: “What would be the best way
to deal with the next Julius Hoffman?”128
125. Article III, § 1 of the United States Constitution reads, “The Judges . . . shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Moreover, federal judges are
considered “civil officers” under Article II, meaning they are subject to impeachment. See Edward
D. Re, Article III Federal Judges, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 79, 83 (1999) (explaining
that federal judges are subject to the impeachment clause); see also Todd D. Peterson, The Role of
the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 809,
880 (explaining that the impeachment process commences with the House of Representatives and
is then conducted by the Senate).
126. The Federal Judicial Center website indicates just fifteen instances of impeachment which
have reached a trial before the Senate. The two most recent proceedings were in 2009 and 2010. In
2009, Samuel B. Kent of the Southern District of Texas was impeached for “sexual assault,
obstructing and impeding an official proceeding, and making false and misleading statements.” In
2010, G. Thomas Porteous Jr. of the Eastern District of Louisiana was impeached “on charges of
accepting bribes and making false statements under penalty of perjury.” Impeachments of Federal
Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/node/7496 (last visited June 20, 2019).
127. As noted by the Brennan Center in its primer on impeachment, “impeachment of judges is
rare, and removal is rarer still.” Douglas Keith, Impeachment and Removal of Judges: An Explainer,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/print/19434. No federal
judge has ever been removed from his position because of his abusive behavior in the courtroom.
State court judges have been removed from office, but it generally takes misconduct beyond being
abusive on the bench. See, e.g., Tom Nobile, Passaic County Judge Removed for Abuse of Office,
N. JERSEY REC. (Sept. 27, 2018, 12:35 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/
passaic/2018/09/27/passaic-county-judge-removed-abuse-office/1442987002/ (judge removed for
improperly aiding a party in a dispute). For an overview of why state court judges have been
removed from office, see generally CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, A STUDY OF STATE
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 7, 9–10 (2002), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/Publications/Study-of-State-Judicial-DisciplineSanctions.ashx (explaining that nationally, 110 judges or former judges were removed from
January 1990 to December 2001; only eight judges were removed for neglect or improper
performance of administrative duties; four judges were removed for abuse of contempt powers or
other abuse of powers).
128. There have been many judges since Judge Hoffman who conducted their courtrooms in a
similar manner. For example, Judge Robert Clive Jones of the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada routinely “excoriated and mocked counsel,” “noted his own laughter on the
record, repeatedly lobbed accusations of malpractice, described counsel’s comments as ‘mealymouthed,’ and suggested that counsel return to law school.” Black Rock City, LLC v. Pershing Cty.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 637 F. App’x 488, 489 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2016). Judge Sam Sparks of the Western
District of Texas was “benchslapped” for a derogatory and condescending order which invited the
lawyers to a “kindergarten party” where they could learn “how to telephone and communicate with
a lawyer.” David Lat, Benchslap of the Day: Judge Sparks Gets a Taste of His Own Medicine,
ABOVE L. (Sep. 13, 2011, 10:19 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2011/09/benchslap-of-the-dayjudge-sparks-gets-a-taste-of-his-own-medicine. In another case, a federal judge was reprimanded
by the Sixth Circuit and asked to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. The judge had threatened
contempt charges against magistrate judges on several occasions. Britain Eakin, Federal Judge
Fights Sixth Circuit’s Reprimand, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Sep. 15, 2017),
https://www.courthousenews.com/federal-judge-fights-sixth-circuits-reprimand.

898

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

A. Creating More Transparency
The Chicago Eight Trial was well covered by journalists.129 Judge
Hoffman was in the news, and the public received at least some
contemporaneous reporting of his handling of the trial.130 However, the
Chicago Eight Trial was the exception, not the rule. In the United States,
there are currently 1,018 federal district judges.131 It is still relatively rare
to have extensive coverage of a federal trial.132 Thus, the everyday
conduct of judges is not seen by most of the public.
In some states, litigants have used social media to expose the demeanor
of abusive judges.133 Seeing is believing. Faced with clear evidence of
129. See, e.g., J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER OBSCENITIES:
NOTES ON THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970); Seale’s Lawyer to Sue Hoffman, WASH.
AFRO-AM., Nov. 4, 1969, at 3, https://news.google.com/newspapers/p/afro?nid=BeIT3YV5
QzEC&dat=19691104&printsec=frontpage&hl=en; William E. Farrell, The Chicago 7, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/11/04/archives/once-more-with-decorumthe-chicago-7.html.
130. See, e.g., Robert Enstad & Robert Davis, Judge Rejects Mistrial Plea by Kunstler: Lawyer
Says Hoffman Prejudiced Riot Trial, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 1969, at 8; J. Anthony Lukas, Bobby
Seale’s Birthday Cake (Oh, Far Out!), N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 1971),
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/10/31/archives/bobby-seales-birthday-cake-oh-far-out-bobbyseales-birthday-cake.html; J. Anthony Lukas, Chicago 7 Judge Bars Ramsey Clark as Defense
Witness, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/01/29/archives/
chicago-7-judge-bars-ramsey-clark-as-defense-witness-chicago-7.html.
131. A search of the biographical directory of Article III federal judges shows 1,018 sitting
district judges. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD.
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search (filter by “All Sitting Judges”;
select all district courts under “Court”) (last visited June 21, 2019).
132. Coverage of federal trials seems to occur when there is a tremendous degree of notoriety
or infamy. For example, the trial of former Army Sergeant Maliek Kearney, accused of murdering
his wife who was also in the military, garnered substantial coverage. See, e.g., Tim Prudente,
Federal Trial to Begin Monday in Killing of Fort Meade Soldier, BALT. SUN (July 15, 2018, 3:00
PM),
www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/anne-arundel/ac-cn-meade-murder-0714story.html. In 2017, Dylann Roof was on trial for, among other things, the murder of nine black
churchgoers in South Carolina. Media coverage was extensive because, again, the events were
notable on a national scale. See, e.g., Khushbu Shah, Martin Savidge & Catherine E. Shoichet,
Dylann Roof Trial: Closing Arguments to Follow Days of Chilling Testimony, CNN (Jan. 9, 2017,
4:31 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/09/us/dylann-roof-trial/index.html (detailing the trial as
it was nearing its end).
133. West Virginia’s Putnam Circuit Judge William Watkins was videotaped screaming at
Pastor Arthur Hage in court during Hage’s divorce proceedings in 2012. In the video, which was
posted on YouTube on June 26, 2012, and has since received over 250,000 hits, the judge chastises
Hage for speaking to a reporter who wrote an article posted on PutnamLive.com, which apparently
showed a picture of the judge’s home. The judge claimed his property was vandalized several times
as a result of the photo. Judge Watkins started the hearing as follows: “Mr. Hage, if you say one
word out of turn, you’re going to jail. Do you understand me? . . . Shut up! Don’t even speak. . . .
You disgusting piece of [inaudible].” He screamed at Hage during most of their exchange. Judge
Watkins later recused himself from any other proceedings in Hage’s case, admitting he lost his
temper. Troyfromwestvirginia, Putnam County, WV, Family Law Judge, William Watkins, May 23,
2012 MELTDOWN!!!!!, YOUTUBE (June 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
APD4a347bPQ. For more examples of judges whose demeanors are showcased on social media,
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their behavior, judges can be confronted to alter their demeanor.
However, it is certainly not guaranteed that such exposure would be an
effective remedy, especially for judges like Judge Hoffman. There are
several reasons for that: (1) federal court proceedings are not broadcast
so viewers would not see a judge’s behavior firsthand;134 (2) judges are
likely to contend that their behavior is being taken out of context and that
the provocation in the courtroom was extreme; and (3) if viewed as a type
of shaming, then such posts are not likely to be particularly effective
mechanisms for changing behavior.135 Yet, observations, short of public
postings, may be in order. Currently, there are websites on which litigants
can report their experiences with judges.136 The bar and the courts should
take responsibility for providing an avenue for public reports. Just like
individuals in other professions, including law professors, are subject to
regular evaluations, so should be judges. However, to the extent that such
websites are used, courts should have the opportunity to correct
misinformation on the postings. This can be problematic given that
judges are barred from speaking publicly regarding a case while it is still
pending, even if on appeal or in another court.137 Thus, it is imperative
that judges create a full and complete record at the time of issuing
sanctions or remarking on a case so that the public record is already
available when there is a posting on the website. Moreover, the current
ethical rules for judges should not bar a judge, or someone on the court’s
behalf, from posting a response to a website entry so long as that response
is simply information already made public in the case.

see generally Goodman, supra note 115.
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. In order to observe a judge’s demeanor, some circuits have adopted
courtroom watchers to report back to the Chief Judge regarding the judge’s behavior. This approach
is not particularly effective because it can only provide a limited window into the judge’s behavior
unless someone is available to sit through all of the court’s proceedings. Moreover, aware that there
is an observer, even the most caustic judges are likely to alter their behavior when an observer is
present.
135. See JUNE PRICE TANGNEY & RONDA L. DEARING, SHAME AND GUILT 137 (2002) (noting
that their results demonstrated that “no apparent benefit was derived from the pain of shame [and
t]here was no evidence that shame inhibits problematic behaviors”); see also Toni M. Massaro, The
Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 688 (1997)
(noting the stigmatizing nature of punitive shame systems).
136. Two websites, The Robing Room and RobeProbe, allow users to rate judges and leave
comments. The Robing Room allows for more in-depth reviews, as the user can rate the judge in
areas like scholarship, punctuality, and evenhandedness. THE ROBING ROOM,
http://www.therobingroom.com/ (last visited June 21, 2019); ROBEPROBE.COM,
http://www.robeprobe.com/ (last visited June 21, 2019).
137. See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 99, at Canon 3A(6) (“A judge should not make public
comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court. A judge should require
similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge’s direction and control.”).
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B. Commissions on Judicial Misconduct
States throughout the nation have various agencies that accept
complaints and issue annual reports regarding judicial misconduct.
Increasingly, these commissions are focusing on judicial demeanor.138 A
judge who is found to have acted inappropriately is subject to a variety of
sanctions, ranging from private reproval to more extreme
punishments.139 Follow-up studies need to be done as to what effect such
sanctions have on deterring that judge and others. All too often, the
commission finds itself facing undue criticism for its handling of a
case.140 There is a thin line between judicial discipline and political
pushback against controversial rulings. Judge Hoffman managed to
present both problems, but demeanor should be enough of a concern that
it warrants supervision as well.
On the federal side, the practice of reporting judicial misconduct to the
circuit’s chief judge as provided by the Rules for Judicial-Conduct &
Judicial-Disability Proceedings,141 established to implement The Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364, has had
mixed results. While “misconduct” may include “treating litigants,
attorneys, or others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner,”142
it remains unclear whether there is a common understanding of what
behavior would meet this standard. Only a change in judicial culture can
ensure that a judge’s demeanor is appropriate. Thus, it is critical that
committees tasked with evaluating judges’ behavior pay close attention
to the complaints being raised and conduct their own independent
investigation into the reputation and conduct of the judge at issue.
Additionally, while commissions are often tasked with deciding on
judicial discipline, it is also critical that they, together with other

138. The Annual Report by the California Commission on Judicial Performance found fourteen
instances of judicial discipline in 2017 that were the result of a judge’s demeanor or decorum.
STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2017),
https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2018/04/2017_Annual_Report.pdf.
139. See id. at 2 (summarizing that the Commission can act confidentially or may engage in
public dispositions).
140. See, e.g., Nate Gartrell, Attorney for Judge Facing Misconduct Fires Back at California
Commission, E. BAY TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017, 10:35 AM), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/
10/19/attorney-for-judge-facing-misconduct-fires-back-at-california-commission/.
141. 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/guidevol02e-ch03.pdf (last updated May 4, 2016). For the history of these rules, see generally Arthur D.
Hellman, When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal Judicial Misconduct
Rules, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 325 (2008).
142. FAQs: Filing a Judicial Conduct or Disability Complaint Against a Federal Judge, U.S.
COURTS (June 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-conduct-disability/faqsfiling-judicial-conduct-or-disability-complaint#faq-Who-can-I-complain-about?.
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institutions that focus on judicial behavior,143 engage in ongoing research
on improving judicial behavior. Judicial ethics benefits from the ongoing
scrutiny of how trials are conducted. A formal complaint against a judge
should not be necessary for a commission to scrutinize highly visible
judicial activity. As a body with expertise, commissions are in a unique
position to conduct ongoing studies regarding judicial behavior.
C. Judicial Education
The single most important step to take to confront the problem of
judges with poor judicial demeanor is to improve judicial ethics
education.144 The current approach to judicial ethics education is for
judges to attend “baby judges school” where a wide variety of ethical
issues, including demeanor, are discussed.145 However, demeanor
demands training by role playing.146 Judges must be forced to confront
difficult situations and have their reactions critiqued before they are in a
courtroom under high stress and where they will not be able to receive
constructive feedback from fellow judges. Judges should be taped during
these training sessions and given an opportunity to view how they come
143. There are an increasing number of law schools that are creating programs to focus on
judicial behavior. See, e.g., About the Judicial Institute, PACE L. SCH., https://law.pace.edu/aboutjudicial-institute (last visited June 21, 2019); Michael Bazeley, Closer Collaboration with Courts
Is Focus of New Law School Institute, BERKELEY L. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/
article/closer-collaboration-with-courts-is-focus-of-new-law-school-institute/.
144. While judicial discipline is often the first focus when there are complaints against a judge,
continuing and introductory judicial education is imperative. See Goodman, supra note 115, at 613–
14 (describing the benefits of restorative justice in the context of judicial discipline).
145. The Federal Judicial Center manages judicial education of federal judges. It is tasked with
“stimulat[ing], creat[ing], develop[ing], and conduct[ing] programs of continuing education and
training for personnel of the judicial branch of the Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 620(a)(3) (2012).
Judge Jeremy Fogel, Director of the Federal Judicial Center, remarked that the objective of the
“baby judge program is to make sure that people have the fundamentals that they need to be able
to do the job.” Associated Press, “Baby Judges School” Is Underway for New Federal Judicial
Appointees, CBS NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018, 8:01 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/baby-judgesschool-is-underway-for-new-federal-judicial-appointees/. The Federal Judicial Center’s 2016
Annual Report indicated that it held a Phase I seminar that focused on “the art of judging, chambers
management . . . ethics and codes of conduct.” FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ANNUAL REPORT 2016
5
(2016),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/FJC_Annual_Report_2016.pdf.
Furthermore, states have established similar programs for judicial education, which deal not only
with substantive legal issues but also with issues of demeanor and ethics. See Diane E. Cowdrey,
Educating into the Future: Creating an Effective System of Judicial Education, 51 S. TEX. L. REV.
885, 897 (2010) (explaining that the education model incorporates “skills-based” training on topics
“such as on-bench demeanor”).
146. An earlier approach to teaching judicial demeanor was to have judges watch video
vignettes and comment on the judicial behavior they observed. See Cynthia Gray & Frances Kahn
Zemans, Instructing Judges: Ethical Experience and Educational Technique, 58 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 305, 308 (1995); Stephen M. Simon & Maury S. Landsman, Judicial Ethics Simulation
Based Training, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 323, 326 (1995). While this approach provided an
improvement to having judges just read ethical codes, it did not go far enough.
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across to a courtroom. They should receive feedback from non-judges as
well as judges. It is completely unrealistic to expect judges to learn how
to behave by reading about it in a rule or book. Mastering demeanor
requires a combination of skills that may not be apparent on a judge’s
resume, including familiarity with psychological principles, increased
empathy, sensitivity to dealing with pro pers, and skills for dealing with
the Abbie Hoffmans and Bobby Seales of this world.147 The Chicago
Eight Trial should be “Judicial Training 101” for judges today.
Judges can also use modern resources to give guidance to each other.
With the advent of judicial blogs,148 judges can provide, as well as seek,
guidance on how to handle difficult situations in the courtroom. While
judges must be careful not to discuss details of individual cases, online
discussions are excellent avenues for judges to remind each other of the
importance of appropriate judicial demeanor and the tools they have to
maintain their composure.149
Improved training regarding judicial demeanor does not mean that
judges should be expected to act without emotion during their
proceedings. In fact, as others have noted, there is value in judges being
both emotionally and cognitively involved in their cases. 150 However,
even if one believes that there is a role for judicial anger, it should not be
exercised in the arbitrary and uncontrolled manner that it was in the
Chicago Eight Trial. Serious attention and study must be made as to when
and what type of judicial emotion is appropriate.151
D. How to Get Judges Who Care About Judicial Demeanor
Promoting judicial decorum cannot come at the expense of active
judges. A 2009 article titled Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A
147. The issue of whether judges, including those being selected for the highest court of the
land, have an appreciation for the importance of demeanor was raised during the confirmation
hearing of Associate Justice Brett Kavanaugh. See, e.g., Ephrat Livni, The Real Meaning of Judicial
Temperament, QUARTZ (Oct. 1, 2018), https://qz.com/1408411/brett-kavanaugh-and-the-politicsof-judicial-temperament/.
148. Active judicial blogs include: Bench and Bar Experiences, AJA Blog, The Magistrates
Blog, and 12th Chancery Court District of Mississippi. Robert Ambrogi, A Quick Survey of Blogs
Written by Judges, LAWSITES, https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2013/04/a-quick-survey-of-blogswritten-by-judges.html (last updated May 13, 2013).
149. See, e.g., Mel Dickstein, Is Judicial Demeanor Important?, MINNPOST (Aug. 19, 2016),
https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2016/08/judicial-demeanor-important/
(admonishing other judges to engage parties before them in a calm manner).
150. See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1485 (2011).
151. Terry A. Maroney, (What We Talk About When We Talk About) Judicial Temperament
(Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/
01/Paper-Maroney.pdf (examining various manifestations of judicial emotion and the attendant
outcomes).
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Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence addressed this ongoing
debate152 between “privileging branch independence” and promoting
“judicial personality.”153
Those judges and legal scholars who favor strict regulation of judicial
conduct value uniformity between judges. They view “discourtesy as a
sufficient evil in itself to be regarded as misconduct.”154 This
interpretation emphasizes neutrality through the passive judge, perhaps
swiftly eliminating Judge Hoffman-like situations from a top-down
approach.
On the other hand, promoting diversity of judicial personalities may be
a benefit of the American legal system. The argument invokes a sort of
synergy among jurists, suggesting that “something greater than the sum
of its parts emerges from the ‘attrition of diverse minds.’”155 Moreover,
the proponents of a wide-ranging set of personalities insist that the literal
reading of the judicial standards misunderstands how judges operate.
That is, judges are personally involved in almost all decisions they
make.156 Thus, establishing regulatory guidance for jurists may be
valuable to improve the judicial system, but overregulation is dangerous.
Stripping judges of their individualism creates mindless automatons
behind the bench,157 thereby plaguing the courts with apathy and
dispassion. As one commentator suggests, this detachment from the cases
would be detrimental because “a more active and colorful judicial style
would do more to lend legitimacy to the judicial process.”158
It will remain difficult for judicial training and discipline to thrive until
the legal community addresses what defines proper judicial demeanor
and how it is affected by a wide variety of factors in the courtroom. Those
factors include, as in the Chicago Eight Trial, the litigants’ race.159
152. The debate is considered an interpretative disagreement. That is, some judges and legal
scholars read “implicit limitations” into the regulation of judicial conduct, while others interpret
the canons and guidelines literally. The literal reading suggests that “a single act of impatience will
subject a judge to punishment, limited only by the enforcement authorities’ discretion whether to
initiate proceedings.” Green & Roiphe, supra note 115, at 540–46.
153. Id. at 540, 544.
154. Id. at 545.
155. Id. at 555 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177
(1921)).
156. See, e.g., id. at 551–52 (“Every judicial decision, to some degree or another, reflects the
personal views, ideology, and intuition of the judge.”); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge
in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2006) (explaining that judges may decide
their cases “in terms of an emotion or a hunch to one side”).
157. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 115, at 554 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 240–42, 262–64 (1999)) (remarking that
“formalism promotes a kind of judicial laziness”).
158. Id. at 555.
159. Cf. Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L.
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Effective enforcement of judicial conduct starts with consistency
between judicial education and interpretation of the standards of conduct.
Judges do not relish judicial education in which they must confront their
own personality quirks through role playing. However, such education is
crucial if judges will develop the skill sets to handle the most challenging
aspects of trial.
E. Judges as Public Servants
Finally, there needs to be a change in the basic culture of federal
judges. Judge Hoffman suffered from perhaps the most extreme form of
“federal judge-itis,” a condition under which a judge thinks that he or she
is the ruler of a fiefdom.160 There are many challenges today to changing
the culture of the courtroom. Some deal with how minorities and women
are treated,161 and some deal with how objective judges are in their
rulings.162 Using the “judge’s demeanor” as an umbrella term to address
the variety of problems raised by Judge Hoffman’s behavior can lead to
an increased focus on changes that are long overdue.
The courts have an opportunity to change the future by recognizing
what went wrong in the past. It is much easier for them to criticize a judge
REV. 1, 4 (2000).
160. One particular blogger, who goes by the title “Irreverent Lawyer,” described Article III
federal judges as believing that they “answer only to themselves and to God.” See The Irreverent
Lawyer, Judge Richard Kopf and Our Unfiltered World, WORDPRESS (July 8, 2014), available at
https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1yfhPJWKvZ8oJPlD-W-Sf09UmgfX14siQ.
161. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual
Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/18/us/alex-kozinski-retires.html (“At least 15 women had accused Mr. Kozinski of
subjecting them to unwanted sexual comments or physical contact, including kissing, hugging and
groping . . . .”); Jared Gilmour, ‘Tainted’ Defendants Get Bad Advice from ‘Rag-Tag’ Black Lives
Matter, Texas Judge Says, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Feb. 27, 2018, 6:08 PM),
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/nation-world/national/article202472444.html
(discussing
public outcry for district judge’s recusal following statements that Black Lives Matter had a
negative influence on young black people); Kathryn Rubino, Fifth Circuit Gives Well-Deserved
Benchslap to Trial Judge Over Sexist Remarks, ABOVE L. (July 9, 2018, 3:15 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/07/fifth-circuit-gives-well-deserved-benchslap-to-trial-judge-oversexist-remarks (describing the Fifth Circuit’s reprimand of a district court judge for making genderbased insults); Tommy Witherspoon, Reprimanded Waco Federal Judge’s Caseload Dwindling,
WACO TRIB.-HERALD (July 26, 2016), https://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/
reprimanded-waco-federal-judge-s-caseload-dwindling/article_7a7c40d7-0493-587e-940db3bbfde47475.html (the judge was “reprimanded and sanctioned for inappropriate sexual conduct
with a former court clerk”).
162. See Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 113 (2017) (“[A]utomatic
biases and cognitions indeed influence a much broader range of judicial decisions than has ever
been considered.”); see also Gregory S. Parks, Judicial Recusal: Cognitive Biases and Racial
Stereotyping, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 696 (2015) (summarizing that judges are
“subject to a whole host of cognitive biases”).
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from a case in the past than to recognize the same traits in themselves or
their colleagues. Thus, just using the Chicago Eight Trial as a starting
place for discussions as to how judges should use their power provides a
valuable tool for getting judges to recognize the potential for abuse of
power.
CONCLUSION
“This is the way my generation was taught.”163
Sometimes it takes a high-profile matter to shine the light on problems
in our criminal justice system. Overly authoritarian judges who become
personally involved in a case is not a problem that ended with the Chicago
Eight Trial. It is a problem that continues to this day. 164 Federal judges
may be independent, but having codes of behavior for everyone in a
courtroom—including the judge—is not contrary to creating a strong and
independent judiciary. In fact, improving standards of conduct is likely
to lead to more respect and power for the bench. It is also likely to ensure
better protection of individuals’ constitutional rights.165
Judge Hoffman was the wrong judge for the wrong case. When a case
becomes a spectacle, a judge must know how to take control without
becoming an autocrat. The best judges are not those who use their
contempt power to show who is boss. The best judges are those who do
not need to use their contempt power to afford both sides a fair trial.
Arming judges with an explicit code of behavior allows them to choose
options other than those used by Judge Hoffman without fear that they
will be perceived as weak. This move might be particularly important as
the bench becomes more diversified. The angry father figure need not be
the current symbol of a good jurist. Men and women from different
backgrounds bring a different style of communication.166 Thank
163. JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS’ GUIDE FOR THE TURN-OF-THE-MILLENIUM 9 (1989),
quoted in Catherine Thérèse Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945,
946 (1991).
164. See, e.g., Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 559 F.3d 888, 904–05 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In the
course of numerous in-person and telephone conferences and hearings, the [district] court directed
profanities at Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ counsel over fifteen times. . . . [T]he court [later] denied
Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to respond . . . and dismissed Plaintiffs’ attempt to explain [the]
orders.”); Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1187 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the district judge’s
one-sided antagonism was so severe as to “ma[k]e a fair trial impossible”); Cobell v. Kempthorne,
455 F.3d 317, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting the district judge’s issuance of sua sponte orders
“exceeded the role of impartial arbiter”).
165. See Jona Goldschmidt, “Order in the Court!”: Constitutional Issues in the Law of
Courtroom Decorum, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
166. Joan Meyers-Levy & Barbara Loken, Revisiting Gender Differences: What We Know and
What Lies Ahead, 25 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 129 (2015); Vinita Mohindra & Samina Azhar,
Gender Communication: A Comparative Analysis of Communicational Approaches of Men and
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goodness that Judge Hoffman showed us how judges should not act. It is
now time for the judiciary to create and abide by standards that will
guarantee that the madness and injustice of that trial is never repeated.

Women at Workplaces, 2 J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 18 (2012). One benefit of using the Chicago Eight
Trial as a historical reference for teaching judicial demeanor is that it poses a model of a maledominated courtroom and questions can be raised of how more diversity in the courtroom might
affect the conduct of the judges and parties. See Elizabeth Langer, Seizing the Moments: The
Beginnings of the Women’s Rights Law Reporter and a Personal Journey, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 592, 598 (2009) (giving a firsthand account of how it was “disconcerting to observe the role
of women or, perhaps more accurately, the non-roles of women” through the public showcase of
the Chicago Eight Trial); see also Clarke, supra note 163 (identifying how courtroom etiquette is
a significant component in the movement to improve professionalism); Susie Salmon,
Reconstructing the Voice of Authority, 51 AKRON L. REV. 143, 146 (2017) (analyzing implicit
gender biases in traditional judicial demeanor paradigms).

